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Abstract
Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usu-
ally dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the re-
ceived view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion,
which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In
this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explo-
sion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a
new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is paraconsistent
if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion.
We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On
the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such
as classical logic and Asenjo-Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics
which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural
logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egre´, Ripley and van
Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices,
respectively.
1 Introduction
Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that rebel against the classical principle,
usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything, or that from a
contradiction, everything follows.
As Priest, Tanaka and Weber say
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The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory
premises, anything can be inferred (...) Inconsistency, according to re-
ceived wisdom, cannot be coherently reasoned about (...) Paraconsistent
logic challenges this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation is said to
be paraconsistent if it is not explosive. [24]
Similarly, in the recent book by Carnielli and Coniglio, it is said that
Paraconsistent logics are able to deal with contradictory scenarios, avoid-
ing triviality by means of the rejection of the Principle of Explosion. [6,
p. 3]
In a nutshell, as Ripley puts it
paraconsistency is a nonentailment claim. [28, p. 773]
The aim of this paper is to offer a new characterization of what paraconsistent
logics are. Our main claim will be that a logic L is paraconsistent if either the
inferential or the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion is invalid in it. These
two formulations of Explosion are, respectively, as follows
A,¬A⇒ B
⇒ A ⇒ ¬A
⇒ B
Where the inferential and the meta-inferential level coincide, roughly, with what
are called (after Avron’s work in [2]), the internal and the external consequence of a
given logic.1 Let us clarify why we take our proposal to be a non-trivial contribution
to the debate about paraconsistency.
First, the received view about paraconsistency has only focused on formulations
of Explosion that concern formulae, i.e. a formula A and its negation ¬A. But
surely this can be taken to be a restricted point of view. In what follows we
will try to broaden this conception by putting forward the aforementioned two
different formulations of Explosion: while the former (the traditional form, that
is) is concerned with formulae, the latter is concerned with inferences or sequents.
Thus, the traditional conception understands Explosion as an inference, whereas
the supplementary conception that we are trying to bring to the table also suggest
to understand Explosion as a meta-inference.
Secondly, this raises the question about the possibility of finding paraconsistent
logics that are so for different inferential reasons. That this possibility is real implies
that our proposed criterion does not collapse with previous characterizations. In
other words, it does not make the (in)validity of Explosion at either of these levels
to collapse into the (in)validity at the other level. To prove this, we will offer
examples of logics which validate both versions of Explosion, logics that invalidate
both, and of logics that invalidate only one of them but not the other.
To carry out our current investigation, this paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2 we introduce the distinction between inferences and meta-inferences, along
with the inferential and the meta-inferential formulations of Explosion, and our new
criteria for paraconsistency. In Section 3 we present four study cases: one logic that
is not paraconsistent, i.e. classical logic, and three logics that are paraconsistent:
1In this paper we will be focusing on the inferential and the meta-inferential level, but when making
our closing remarks in Section 5 we will point towards a plausible (although not developed here) more
general conception of paraconsistency, which will require looking at many more levels.
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Asenjo-Priest’s LP, and two substructural logics TS (a q-logic, as defined in [19],
discussed by Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij [8], Malinowski [21], and French
[14]) and ST (a p-logic, as defined in [12], discussed by Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and
van Rooij [8]). These logics are shown to be paraconsistent in different inferential
ways. While LP invalidates both the inferential and the meta-inferential formu-
lations of Explosion, TS invalidates the former but not the latter, whereas ST
validates the former but not the latter. In Section 4 we provide some philosoph-
ical reflections drawn from our previous discussions, connecting our results with
the debate on logical pluralism and the inferentialist stance towards the meaning
of the logical connectives. Moreover, we consider three possible objections against
our account and provide replies to all of them. Finally, in Section 5 we offer some
concluding remarks, and point to some directions in which the present explorations
can be further developed.
2 Different inferential ways of being paraconsis-
tent
2.1 Inferences and Meta-inferences
In order to understand and carry on our investigation, it will be important to have a
more precise grasp of the received view about paraconsistent logics and Explosion.
This view, traditionally takes paraconsistent logics as Tarskian logics and, so, we
shall better understand what these are.
For the purpose of analyzing these matters, it will be useful to fix some termi-
nology. Let L be a propositional language, such that FOR(L) is the absolutely free
algebra of formulae of L, whose universe we denote by FOR(L).
Definition 2.1. A Tarskian consequence relation over a propositional language L
is a relation  ⊆ ℘(FOR(L)) × FOR(L) obeying the following conditions for all
A ∈ FOR(L) and for all Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L):
1. Γ  A if A ∈ Γ (Reflexivity)
2. If Γ  A and Γ ⊆ Γ′, then Γ′  A (Monotonicity)
3. If ∆  A and Γ  B for every B ∈ ∆, then Γ  A (Cut)
Additionally, a (Tarskian) consequence relation  is subsitution-invariant whenever
if Γ  A, and σ is a substitution on FOR(L), then {σ(B) | B ∈ Γ}  σ(A).
Definition 2.2. A Tarskian logic over a propositional language L is an ordered pair
(FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant Tarskian consequence relation.
Throughout the years many scholars have argued that the Tarskian concep-
tion of logic is quite narrow. For example, Shoesmith and Smiley [30], Avron [3]
and Scott [29] claimed that the Tarskian account should be generalized to a logic
having multiple consequences; and Avron [3] and Gabbay [15] have argued that
the condition of Monotonicity should be relaxed; whereas it can be inferred that,
derivatively, Malinowski [19] and Frankowski [12] argued for a generalization or
liberalization which allows logics to drop Reflexivity and/or Cut.
These modifications, in turn, can be made sense of by noticing a shift in the
nature of the collection of formulae featured in the consequence relation. Thus, for
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example, instead of treating logical consequence to hold between (sets of) formulae,
it may hold between labelled formulae, sequences of formulae (where order matters),
multisets of formulae (where repetition matters), etc. Interestingly, many of these
approaches invalidate Explosion, regarded as an inference that relates collections
(sets, sequences, multisets, etc.) of formulae. But none of the aforementioned alter-
natives proposed explicitly to move from logical consequence as a relation conceived
between collections of formulae to a relation conceived between collections of some
other entities. Therefore, none of these alternatives proposed explicitly to change
from focusing on Explosion as an inference that relates formulae to an inference
that relates other entities.
However, some other approaches did. That is the case of Avron in [2], first,
and Blok and Jo´nsson in [5], second, which discuss a generalization of the Tarksian
account that allows to move to logical consequence relations that do not hold only
between collections of formulae, but between objects of other nature.
Definition 2.3. An inference or sequent on L is an ordered pair (Γ, A), where
Γ ⊆ FOR(L) and A ∈ FOR(L) (written Γ ⇒ A). SEQ0(L) is the set of all
inferences or sequents on L.
Definition 2.4 ([11]). A meta-inference or meta-sequent on L is an ordered pair
(Γ, A), where Γ ⊆ SEQ0(L) and A ∈ SEQ0(L) (written Γ⇒1 A). SEQ1(L) is the
set of all meta-inferences or meta-sequents on L.
We will say, accordingly, that from the following the one on the left is an infer-
ence, whereas the one on the right is a meta-inference
A,B ⇒ A ∧B
⇒ A ⇒ B
⇒ A ∧B
and, indeed, according to the following definitions adapted from Avron [2], both
are valid in e.g. Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK for classical logic—as we shall see
next, when we define the corresponding notions of validity.
Now, going back to the proposed shifts from the ontology of the Tarskian account
of logical consequence, Avron suggested in [2] that the idea that logical consequence
can be said to hold of relata other than formulae is very reasonable to those used
to sequent calculus—and, most prominently, with substructural sequent calculi.
For Avron there are two different notions of logical consequence for a given
sequent calculus S: the internal and the external notion of logical consequence. In
our work, however, instead of referring to these relations as internal and external,
we will refer to these levels, respectively, as the inferential and the meta-inferential,
characterized such that
• A follows inferentially from Γ in S (written `S Γ ⇒ A) whenever Γ ⇒ A
is a provable sequent of the calculus S. In such a case we will say that the
inference from Γ to A is S-valid.
This relation is concerned with which formulae follow from which (collection of)
formulae, given the rules of the calculus—i.e which sequents follow, given the axioms
and rules of the calculus.
• A follows meta-inferentially from Γ in S (written `S Γ⇒1 A) whenever⇒A is
provable in the calculus that results from the addition to S of all the sequents
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⇒B (for B in Γ) as initial sequents or axioms.2 In such a case we will say
that the meta-inference from Γ to A is S-valid.
This means that this relation is concerned with which sequents follow from which
(set of) sequents, given the axioms and rules of the calculus.
That these relations are different can be easily exemplified by the fact, nicely
noticed by Mares and Paoli in [22], that if a sequent calculus S has no Weakening
rules, then
0S A,B ⇒ A although `S A,B ⇒1 A
Finally, notice also in passing that re-writing the meta-inference
⇒A ⇒¬A
⇒B
with the aid of the previous notation, gives us as a result
{⇒A,⇒¬A} ⇒1 ⇒B
which, for matters of readability, we will write as
A,¬A⇒1 B
reinforcing, thereby, the idea that we are dealing with nothing more than yet another
formulation of Explosion. Something that we will argue for explicitly in the next
section.
2.2 Explosion, revisited
Explosion, so to speak, comes in different flavors. Many rules, meta-rules and
principles are dubbed with that name. Nevertheless, there are what seems to be
some central or essential features that every one of them share, and indeed it is
that they embody the idea that contradiction equals triviality. This is traditionally
understood, in terms of the received view about paraconsistency as saying that
An inference with an inconsistent premise set implies any conclusion
As is well-known, inconsistent premise sets for inferences are sets that include (some
instance of) the (schematic) formulae A and ¬A. So, along these lines, Explosion
is without any surprise taken to be the inference
A,¬A⇒ B
The question is now, how to adapt this idea to the case of meta-inferences. For
us, the most reasonable take is to say that
A meta-inference with an inconsistent premise set implies any conclusion
2We shall notice that in [2] Avron takes this definition to, additionally, require that Cut is taken as
a primitive rule. Something that—for the sake of generality—we do not demand here.
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But, now, for meta-inferences, we must keep in mind that premise sets and conclu-
sions are formed with sequents. Thus, we must define what an inconsistent premise
set for meta-inferences is. We take these to be sets that include (some instance
of) the (schematic) sequents ⇒ A and ⇒ ¬A. That this is, in fact, a right way
to understand an inconsistent sequent set can be argued for by looking at e.g. the
definition of an inconsistent belief set (cf. [17]). Along these lines, Explosion is
without any surprise taken to be the meta-inference
⇒ A ⇒ ¬A
⇒ B
Furthermore, we are in good company in claiming that these are in fact two
versions or formulations of Explosion, one as an inference and the other as a meta-
inference. For Lloyd Humberstone, in his reference book The Connectives says in
[18, p. 118-119] that A,¬A⇒ B is a sequent, i.e. an inferential form of Explosion,
whereas the following is a rule, i.e. a meta-inferential form of Explosion.
Γ⇒ A ∆⇒ ¬A
Γ,∆⇒ B
By letting Γ and ∆ be empty, Humberstone proposed form collapses with ours.3
To conclude, let us rephrase in a more formal manner the main claim of this
paper
A logic L is paraconsistent if
{
either A,¬A⇒ B is invalid in L
or A,¬A⇒1 B is invalid in L
Additionally, let us highlight that we are not claiming these two are the only
dresses that Explosion can use. If a logic invalidates either of the previous for-
mulations of Explosion, we will say that it is paraconsistent, although it need not
invalidate either to be so, for it may invalidate some other formulation(s) of Explo-
sion. For example, Explosion is sometimes formulated with the help of conjunction.
Exploring ‘conjunctive’ versions of Explosion (both at the inferential and the meta-
inferential level) is no doubt an interesting task, one which for matters of space we
decided not to tackle here. In other words, we are not proposing a necessary, but a
new sufficient condition for logics to be paraconsistent.
An additional caveat, which echoes the well-known reservations expressed by
Igor Urbas in [34], should be mentioned concerning this characterization. In his
work, Urbas points out that the traditional definition of paraconsistency in terms
of invalidating the inferential form of Explosion counts as paraconsistent some logics
“which satisfy the letter of [this criterion] while brazenly flouting its spirit” [34, p.
345]. For instance, Johansson’s Minimal Logic invalidates Explosion, while validat-
ing the scheme A,¬A⇒ ¬B, for arbitrary formulae B. Furthermore, as highlighted
by an anonymous referee, this logic will also invalidate the meta-inferential formu-
lation of Explosion, while still validating the scheme A,¬A ⇒1 ¬B, for arbitrary
formulae B. Thus, these considerations lead us to note that these pathological cases
can—and probably should—be exempted from the definition.
3Let us notice, additionally, that Humberstone calls Ex Falso Quodlibet what we call Explosion, but
this is just a terminological and non-substantial issue.
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In what follows we will compare different cases of different logics, showing that
all of them take a distinctive stance with regard to the valid or invalid character of
the above portrayed inferential and meta-inferential versions of Explosion.
3 Study Cases
To accomplish our task in this section, we will divide these systems in two groups.
The first group will be composed of matrix logics and will include a logic that is not
paraconsistent at any level, i.e. classical logic CL, and a logic that is paraconsistent
both at the inferential and the meta-inferential level, i.e. Asenjo-Priest’s 3-valued
logic LP from [1] and [23]. The second group will be composed of a q-matrix logic4,
i.e. the logic TS, and a p-matrix logic5, i.e. the logic ST, both due to Cobreros,
Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij in [8], the former being also discussed by Malinowski in
[21]. These logics will be shown to be, respectively, paraconsistent at the inferential
but not the meta-inferential level, and paraconsistent at the meta-inferential but
not the inferential level.
3.1 Matrix logics
Definition 3.1. For L a propositional language, an L-matrix is a structure M =
〈V,D,O〉, such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as L, with
universe V and a set of operations O, and D ⊆ V.
Notice, in the first place, that the set O includes for every n-ary connective 
in the language L, a corresponding n-ary truth-function fM : Vn −→ V. With
regard to these, when context allows it, we will sometimes identify the connectives
themselves (which are linguistic items), with their corresponding truth-functions
in a given matrix. In the second place, notice that typically, when dealing with
non-classical logics, the set V is taken to be a superset of {t, f}.
Definition 3.2. ForM an L-matrix (respectively, an L-q-matrix or an L-pmatrix),
an M-valuation v is an homomorphism from FOR(L) to V, for which we denote
by v[Γ] the set {v(B) | B ∈ Γ}, i.e. the image of v under Γ.
Of interest are two-valued classical logic CL (which we do not bother to present
here due to the fact that it is perhaps the best known matrix logic), and the Asenjo-
Priest’s 3-valued logic LP, which is defined based on the 3-element Kleene algebra.
Definition 3.3. The 3-element Kleene algebra is the structure
K = 〈{t, i, f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
where the functions f¬K, f
∧
K, f
∨
K are as follows
f¬K
t f
i i
f t
f∧K t i f
t t i f
i i i f
f f f f
f∨K t i f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
4q-consequence relations and q-matrices were introduced by Grzegorz Malinowski in [19]
5p-consequence relations and p-matrices were introduced by Szymon Frankowski in [12]
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Definition 3.4 ([1, 23]). A 3-valued LP-matrix is a structure
MLP = 〈{t, i, f}, {t, i}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
such that 〈{t, i, f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
With these definitions we are now in a position to ask which formulations of
Explosion are valid, and which are invalid in classical logic and in LP. However, for
this question to be meaningful, it is necessary to clarify how matrix logics validate
or invalidate both inferences and meta-inferences. Notice that, below, M is a
substitution-invariant Tarskian consequence relation over L, whence (FOR(L),M)
is a Tarskian logic. In addition to that, when some logic L is induced by a matrix
M, we may interchangeably refer to M as L.
Definition 3.5. ForM a matrix, anM-valuation v satisfies a sequent or inference
Γ ⇒ A (written v M Γ ⇒ A) iff if v[Γ] ⊆ D, then v(A) ∈ D. A sequent or
inference Γ ⇒ A is M-valid (written M Γ ⇒ A) iff v M Γ ⇒ A, for all M-
valuations v.
Definition 3.6. For M a matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a meta-sequent or
meta-inference Γ ⇒1 A (written v M Γ ⇒1 A) iff if v M B, for all B ∈ Γ,
then v M A. A meta-sequent or meta-inference Γ ⇒1 A is M-valid (written
M Γ⇒1 A) iff if v M B, for all B ∈ Γ, then v M A, for all M-valuations v.
Recall that in the last definition e.g. B stands for a sequent, i.e. an object of
the form Σ ⇒ C, and therefore e.g. v M B should be read as v M Σ ⇒ C.
Accordingly, when Σ is empty, it should be read as M ∅ ⇒ C, which for matters
of readability we write as M ⇒C.
Given these definitions it is easy to observe the following facts.
Fact 3.7. Classical logic CL validates both the inferential and the meta-inferential
formulation of Explosion, i.e. CL A,¬A⇒ B and CL A,¬A⇒1 B.
Proof. These two facts are straightforwardly verified by noticing that there is no
CL-valuation v such that v({A,¬A}) ⊆ {t}, i.e. that there is no CL-valuation v
such that v CL ⇒A and v CL ⇒¬A. From this we infer, on the one hand, that
there is no CL-valuation v such that v({A,¬A}) ⊆ {t} and v(B) /∈ {t}, whence
CL A,¬A ⇒ B. And, on the other hand, that there is no CL-valuation v such
that v CL ⇒A and v CL ⇒¬A and v 2CL ⇒B, whence CL A,¬A⇒1 B.
Fact 3.8. The logic LP invalidates both the inferential and the meta-inferential
formulation of Explosion, i.e. 2LP A,¬A⇒ B and 2LP A,¬A⇒1 B.
Proof. To prove this facts, it is routine to construct an LP-valuation v such that
v(A) = v(¬A) = i, while v(B) = f . From this we infer, on the one hand, that v is
a valuation such that v({A,¬A}) ⊆ {t, i} and v(B) /∈ {t, i}, whence 2LP A,¬A⇒
B. On the other hand, we infer that v is a valuation such that v LP ⇒A and
v LP ⇒¬A, while v 2LP ⇒B, whence we conclude that 2LP A,¬A⇒1 B.
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3.2 q-matrix logics and p-matrix logics
Two interesting generalizations of Tarskian consequence relations appeared in the
last two decades, the notion of q-consequence relation, due to Malinowski [19] and
the notion of p-consequence relation, due to Frankowski [12]. As Wansing and
Shramko clearly explain in [31], the corresponding relation of q-logic is devised to
qualify as valid derivations of true sentences from non-refuted premises (understood
as hypotheses), whereas the notion of p-logic is devised to qualify as valid derivations
of conclusions whose degree of strength (understood as the conviction in its truth)
is smaller than that of the premises. We define these notions formally as follows.
Definition 3.9 ([19]). A q-consequence relation over a propositional language L
is a relation  ⊆ ℘(FOR(L)) × FOR(L) obeying the following conditions for all
A ∈ FOR(L) and for all Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L):
1. If Γ  A and Γ ⊆ Γ′, then Γ′  A (Monotonicity)
2. Γ ∪ {B | Γ  B}  A iff Γ  A (Quasi-closure)
Definition 3.10 ([19]). A q-logic over a propositional language L is an ordered
pair (FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant q-consequence relation.
Definition 3.11 ([12]). A p-consequence relation over a propositional language L
is a relation  ⊆ ℘(FOR(L)) × FOR(L) obeying the following conditions for all
A ∈ FOR(L) and for all Γ,∆ ⊆ FOR(L):
1. Γ  A if A ∈ Γ (Reflexivity)
2. If Γ  A and Γ ⊆ Γ′, then Γ′  A (Monotonicity)
Definition 3.12 ([12]). A p-logic over a propositional language L is an ordered
pair (FOR(L),), where  is a substitution-invariant p-consequence relation.
Notice, moreover, that q-logics fail to validate Reflexivity, while p-logics fail to
validate Cut and, thus, are both non-Tarskian or substructural logics.
Semantically speaking, q-logics and p-logics can be obtained from structures
called, respectively, q-matrices and p-matrices, by similar means than Tarskian
logics are obtained from regular matrices. Whence, we may refer to them as q-
matrix logics and p-matrix logics.
Definition 3.13 ([19]). For L a propositional language, an L-q-matrix is a struc-
ture 〈V,D+,D−,O〉, such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as L,
with universe V and a set of operations O, where D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ∩ D− = ∅.
Definition 3.14 ([13]). For L a propositional language, an L-p-matrix is a struc-
ture 〈V,D+,D−,O〉, such that 〈V,O〉 is an algebra of the same similarity type as
L, with universe V and a set of operations O, where D+,D− ⊆ V and D+ ⊆ D−.
A word on how q- and p-matrices generalize the usual notion of a logical matrix
is in order. In a usual logical matrix 〈V,D,O〉 the truth-values of the matrix, i.e.
the elements of V, are presented in a dichotomized way. By this we mean that they
either belong to D—and, hence, are designated—or they belong to V \ D—and,
hence, are anti-designated.
Contrary to this, q- and p-matrices start from a non-dichotomized classification
of the truth-values of the given matrix—i.e. the members of V—letting them belong
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to two sets, which we here call D+ and D−.6 We will, then, allow these sets
to be jointly non-exhaustive and mutually non-exclusive. Paradigmatically, the
first note of this generalization is associated with q-matrices, where it is allowed
that D+ ∪ D− 6= V (see e.g. [20, p. 12]). Analogously, the second note of this
generalization is associated with p-matrices, where it is allowed that D+ ∩ D− 6= ∅
(see e.g. [12, p. 45]).
From a purely abstract point of view, the sets D+ and D− need not be attached
any particular philosophical interpretation and, thus, the symbols + and − are
taken by us to be arbitrary. Notwithstanding this, e.g. in the context of Mali-
nowski’s discussion of q-matrices, they are usually taken to represent, respectively,
the set of accepted and rejected elements (see [21]). Whereas, in the context of
Frankowski’s discussion of p-matrices they are usually taken to represent, respec-
tively, the set of values representing the degree of strength of the premises and
the set of values representing the degree of strength of the conclusion (see [12]).
Furthermore, in the context of Wansing and Shramko’s discussion of q-matrices,
those truth-values belonging to D+ are identified as representatives of a general-
ized notion of truth and those truth-values belonging to D− as representatives of a
generalized notion of falsity (see [32, p. 195]).
There are two 3-valued q- and p-matrix logics associated to the 3-element Kleene
algebra that are discussed in the literature, which we would like to present in
connection to our ongoing investigation: the logic TS and the logic ST.
Definition 3.15 ([8], [21]). A 3-valued TS-matrix is a q-matrix
MTS = 〈{t, i, f}, {t}, {f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
such that 〈{t, i, f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
Definition 3.16 ([8]). A 3-valued ST-matrix is a p-matrix
MST = 〈{t, i, f}, {t}, {t, i}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉
such that 〈{t, i, f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
The former is discussed by e.g. Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij in [8],
and also by Chemla, Egre´ and Spector in [7] in the context of the more general
discussion of what represents a ‘respectable’ consequence relation between formulae.
Moreover, it was also discussed by Grzegorz Malinowski in [21] as a tool to model
empirical inference with the aid of the 3-valued Kleene algebra, and more recently
was also stressed by Rohan French in [14], in connection with the paradoxes of
self-reference.
The latter is discussed by Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij in several papers
(among them [8], [26], [27] and [9]), with the aim of solving the riddles raised by
paradoxical phenomena, vagueness, and much more. It must be pointed out that
it was also entertained by Girard in [16] as a 3-valued interpretation of the sequent
calculus LK for classical propositional logic, without the Cut rule.
Once more, equipped with these definitions we are now in a position to ask
which formulations of Explosion are valid, and which are invalid in the q-matrix
6Here we will adopt this terminology—i.e. talk of D+ and D−—introduced by [32], emphasizing
that we will take q- and p-logics to be induced by different type of structures, i.e. respectively q- and
p-matrices. In this vein, what will be distinctive of these type of structures will be the properties of the
sets D+ and D−, as detailed in Definition 3.13 and Definition 3.14, respectively.
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logic TS and the p-matrix logic ST. Yet again, for this question to be meaningful,
it is necessary to clarify how q- and p-matrix logics validate or invalidate both
inferences and meta-inferences—following e.g. [12] and [32, p. 196]. Notice that,
below, M is a substitution-invariant q-consequence (respectively, p-consequence)
relation, whence (FOR(L),M) is a q-logic (respectively, a p-logic). In addition to
that, when some q- or p-logic L is induced by, respectively, a q- or p- matrix M,
we may interchangeably refer to M as L.
Definition 3.17. For M a q-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a sequent or
inference Γ⇒ A (written v M Γ⇒ A) iff if v[Γ] ∩ D− = ∅, then v(A) ∈ D+. For
M a p-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a sequent or inference Γ ⇒ A (written
v M Γ ⇒ A) iff if v[Γ] ⊆ D+, then v(A) ∈ D−.7 For M a q-matrix or p-matrix,
a sequent or inference Γ ⇒ A is M-valid (written M Γ ⇒ A) iff v M Γ ⇒ A,
for all M-valuations v.
Definition 3.18. For M a q-matrix or p-matrix, an M-valuation v satisfies a
meta-sequent or meta-inference Γ ⇒1 A (written v M Γ ⇒1 A) iff if v M B,
for all B ∈ Γ, then v M A. A meta-sequent or meta-inference Γ ⇒1 A is M-
valid (written M Γ ⇒1 A) iff if v M B, for all B ∈ Γ, then v M A, for all
M-valuations v.
From these definitions the following facts follow.
Fact 3.19 ([8]). TS is a non-reflexive, and thus a substructural, logic.
Fact 3.20 ([8]). ST is a non-transitive, and thus a substructural, logic.
Fact 3.21. The logic TS invalidates the inferential formulation of Explosion, i.e.
2TS A,¬A⇒ B, but it validates the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion, i.e.
TS A,¬A⇒1 B.
Proof. To prove that 2TS A,¬A⇒ B construct a TS-valuation v such that v(A) =
v(¬A) = i, i.e. v({A,¬A}) = {i}, while v(B) = f . From this we infer that v is a
valuation such that v({A,¬A})∩{f} = ∅ and v(B) /∈ {t}, whence 2TS A,¬A⇒ B.
To prove that TS A,¬A ⇒1 B, suppose for reductio that 2TS A,¬A ⇒1 B.
Then, there should be a TS-valuation v, such that v TS ⇒A and v TS ⇒¬A,
while v 2TS ⇒B. Such a valuation will require that v(A) = t = v(¬A), which is
impossible. Whence, we conclude TS A,¬A⇒1 B.
Fact 3.22 ([4]). The logic ST validates the inferential formulation of Explosion, i.e.
ST A,¬A ⇒ B, but it invalidates the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion,
i.e. 2ST A,¬A⇒1 B.
7 Notice that this definition takes a p-logic to be induced by a p-matrix 〈V,D+,D−,O〉 where it is
assumed that D+ ⊆ D−, whence this last clause reads: “if v[Γ] ⊆ D+, then v(A) ∈ D−”. Now, as re-
marked by an anonymous referee, if the same p-logic is taken to be induced by a q-matrix 〈V,D+,D−,O〉
where it is assumed that D+ ∩ D− = ∅—as is done e.g. in [32, p. 210]—then this last clause should
read: “if v[Γ] ⊆ D+, then v(A) /∈ D−”.
These considerations highlight that if the sets D+ and D− of a q-matrix are taken to, respectively,
represent a generalized notion of truth and a generalized notion of falsity—as in [32]—then with regard to
valuations on the 3-element Kleene algebra, TS and ST can be interpreted as follows. TS consequence
can be understood as requiring that for all valuations, if the premises are non-false, then the conclusion
is true; whereas ST consequence can be understood as requiring that for all valuations, if the premises
are true, then the conclusion is non-false.
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Proof. To prove that ST A,¬A ⇒ B, suppose for reductio that 2ST A,¬A ⇒
B. Then, there should be an ST-valuation v, such that v({A,¬A}) ⊆ {t}, while
v(B) /∈ {t, i}. Such a valuation will require that v(A) = t = v(¬A), which is
impossible. Whence, we conclude ST A,¬A⇒ B.
To prove that 2ST A,¬A⇒1 B construct an ST-valuation v such that v(A) =
v(¬A) = i, i.e. v({A,¬A}) = {i}, while v(B) = f . From this we infer that v
is a valuation such that v ST ⇒A and v ST ⇒¬A, while v 2ST ⇒B, whence
2ST A,¬A⇒1 B.
Before moving on, it might be worth noticing—as pointed out by an anonymous
referee—that according to TS and ST the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion
is closely related to a restricted form of Cut. To be more precise, given these systems
validate e.g. the rule of right Weakening [WR] and also the left introduction rule
for negation [¬L], it is true that the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion is
equivalent to a restricted form of Cut—indeed, of both the additive [CutA] or the
multiplicative [CutM] version of Cut8—where the side formulae are empty.9
We can, in fact, provide more general facts from which the previous can be seen
as corollaries. We do think that, nevertheless, giving the proper counterexamples
for the particular cases above is illustrative, as these logics are not so commonly
mentioned in the literature about paraconsistent logics.
Fact 3.23. TS has no valid inferences or sequents.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary inference or sequent Γ ⇒ A, and consider a TS-
valuation v, such that v assigns the value i to every propositional variable of L.
Given TS is a q-matrix based on the 3-valued Kleene algebra, it is easy to see by
looking at the operations of the algebra that if every propositional variable p is
such that v(p) = i, then every formula C is such that v(C) = i, and in particular
for every B ∈ Γ, v(B) = i. Now, it only remains to notice that v is a TS-valuation
such that v[Γ] ∩ {f} = ∅, but v(A) /∈ {t}, whence 2TS Γ ⇒ A. Since Γ ⇒ A was
arbitrary, we may conclude that TS has no valid inferences or sequents.
Fact 3.24 ([16], [26]). ST and CL have the same set of valid inferences or sequents.
About these logics we shall mention, in addition to the previous remarks, that
in [4], [11] and [25] it is shown that—through some suitable translation—the set of
valid inferences in LP coincides with the set of valid meta-inferences in ST, while
in [14] it is conjectured that—again, through some suitable translation—the set of
8By these rules we refer to the following, respectively.
Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆ [WR]
Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ [¬L]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ ⇒ ∆ [Cut
A]
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Σ ⇒ ϕ,Π
Γ,Σ ⇒ ∆,Π [Cut
M]
9Whence, the aforementioned equivalence is witnessed e.g. by the following derivation, where the
application of [Cut ] is a rightful instance of both [CutA] and [CutM].
∅ ⇒ ¬A
∅ ⇒ A
¬A⇒ ∅ [¬L]
∅ ⇒ ∅ [Cut ]
∅ ⇒ B [WR]
12
valid inferences in K3, i.e. Strong Kleene logic
10, coincides with the set of valid
meta-inferences in TS. As Francesco Paoli pointed out to us, this conjecture was
shown to be true, in light of the results proved in [33].
4 Philosophical reflections
The previous discussion dealt with classical logic and three systems which, in light
of the previously proposed criterion, might be legitimately called paraconsistent.
Certainly, that classical logic is not, but LP is paraconsistent should not sur-
prise anyone, since these are well-known facts. Nevertheless, given our proposal,
the previous remarks allow to offer a new look at the these systems. In this regard,
we will say that LP, as well as CL adopt a uniform policy with regard to paracon-
sistency. We mean with this that, just like CL is not paraconsistent at either the
inferential or the meta-inferential level, LP is both paraconsistent at the inferential
and the meta-inferential level.
These remarks about uniformity suggest that it is reasonable to ask whether or
not it is possible to have logics which have a non-uniform policy towards paraconsis-
tency. A positive answer to this question has been offered in the previous sections.
Two examples of the meaningfulness of this alternative are the substructural logics
TS and ST. The former is paraconsistent, although it is not uniformly so, for it
is paraconsistent at the inferential level, but not at the meta-inferential level. The
latter is paraconsistent, although it is also not uniformly so, for it is paraconsistent
at the meta-inferential level, but not at the inferential level.
Let us now comment on two philosophically discussions where the above remarks
can have some interesting repercussions. Claiming that there are some paraconsis-
tent logics which give a uniform and other that have a non-uniform policy with
regard to the validity of Explosion is relevant to the discussion of logical pluralism:
different levels of logical consequence can give different answers about the validity
of a certain inference, rule, or scheme—in the case that concerns us, about Ex-
plosion. But, of course, these remarks can be generalized. As Barrio, Rosenblatt
and Tajer [4] have shown, meta-inferential validity in ST coincides (through some
suitable translation) with inferential validity in LP. If we also take into account
that Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij proved that ST and CL have the same
set of valid inferences or sequents, this result can be interpreted conceptually as
the admission that two rival logics are both right, i.e. CL could be a correct re-
sponse at the level of inferences and LP could be a right answer at the level of
meta-inferences.
Obviously, we are not claiming that cases in which the inferential and the meta-
inferential notion of validity come apart are a proof of logic pluralism. It is also
possible to support the view according to which meta-inferential validity imposes
conditions on inferential validity, as e.g. Dicher and Paoli [11] seem to maintain.
Or that meta-inferential validity has no weight, for the only thing that matters
is inferential validity logic, as Ripley and the defenders of ST seem to maintain.
Instead, we affirm that logics like ST and TS open the possibility of adopting a
pluralistic attitude about logic: depending on what level we are interested, different
appropriate answers could be given.
10That is, the matrix logic induced by the structure MK3 = 〈{t, i, f}, {t}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉, such that
〈{t, i, f}, {f¬K, f∧K, f∨K}〉 is the 3-element Kleene algebra.
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Another important issue that the present discussion might have consequences
for, is the question about the meaning of logical connectives, and—most importantly—
the relation that their meanings have with their behavior in various inferential lev-
els. For example, in ST modus ponens is valid for the conditional at the inferential
level, but it is not a valid rule at the meta-inferential level, as Zardini [35] points
out. If the meaning of a logical connective is given by the valid inferences in which
it is involved, logics as ST seem to admit connectives with different meanings at
different inferential levels.
Moreover, for inferentialists the question arises as to whether or not the meta-
inferential properties of the logics (at least partly) determine the meaning of the
connectives of the given system, as Dicher [10] seems to suggest. That is, if we
compare the connectives of, for example, TS, ST and CL proof-theoretically11—
following the remarks of e.g. [14]—do they have the same meaning, given they are
equipped with the same set of operational rules? All these questions are of deep
philosophical import, and we hope to discuss them in future work.
4.1 Answers to some possible objections
To conclude this section, let us evaluate a number of objections that might be raised
against our approach. We consider, initially, two objections which question that
TS and ST are genuine paraconsistent logics. After that, we consider an objection
that questions the extent to which our proposed criterion of paraconsistency is
reasonable.
The first objection aims at TS, and it concerns whether or not it is a para-
consistent logic in a trivial sense. Everyone would accept (even if they do not
accept our proposed characterization of a paraconsistent logic) that an inferential
consequence relation with no valid inferences is paraconsistent. For Explosion is a
(schematic) inference, and if no (schematic) inference is valid, a fortiori Explosion
will be invalid for that logical consequence relation. This is, in fact, the situation
with inferential validity in TS.
Now, the objection goes: in which sense is a consequence relation with no valid
inferences a genuine consequence relation? It seems that it is as meaningless as
a consequence relation as the empty set itself, and—as Chemla, Egre´ and Spector
suggest in [7]—it will be definitely non-standard to call the empty set a genuine
consequence relation, let alone a logic. Furthermore, if a consequence relation with
no valid inferences is not a genuine consequence relation, it hardly can represent a
genuine paraconsistent consequence relation.
To this we reply by noticing, as is done in [7], that the fact that TS has no
valid inferences does not allow to identify its inferential consequence relation with
the empty set. For, in a certain sense, the fact that TS has no valid inferences
is dependent on the language being employed. Were we to have a constant >
representing the value t, and a constant ⊥ representing the value f , then e.g. the
following inferences will be valid in the referred extension of TS (and, thus, of the
3-valued Kleene algebra)
> ⇒ > ⊥ ⇒ ⊥ ⊥ ⇒ >
11Along these lines, CL can be proof-theoretically understood as Gentzen’s sequent calculi LK, TS
as LK minus the structural rule of Reflexivity, and ST as LK minus the structural rule of Cut.
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More importantly, the addition of such constants to TS will not imply the validity
of Explosion at the inferential level. Therefore, TS is a paraconsistent logic in a
meaningful and non-trivial sense.
The second objection aims at ST, whose peculiarly non-uniform way of being
paraconsistent has been called into question in some recent papers like [4] and
[11], causing an impasse regarding the qualification ST deserves as a classical or
non-classical logic.
On the one hand, some of its advocates (i.e. Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van
Rooij) seem to claim that, given ST coincides with CL at the inferential level,
then ST deserves to be referred nothing more than an alternative presentation of
classical logic. This argumentative line appears to be supported by the fact that
J.-Y. Girard employed in [16] the ST 3-valued q-matrix to give a presentation of
classical logic where Cut fails.
On the other hand, some of its critiques, like Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer in
[4] and Dicher and Paoli in [11] appear to think that ST should not be identified
with classical logic, but with LP. This argumentative line appears to be supported
also by the fact that e.g. Cobreros, Ripley, Egre´ and van Rooij usually present ST
as Gentzen’s sequent calculus LK for classical logic, minus the structural Cut rule.
But if they prefer to talk about ST as a sequent calculus system, then they are
prone to the following imputation due to Dicher and Paoli
Notice, however, that in a sequent calculus all of the action takes place at
the level of sequent-to-sequent rules, whereby from one or more sequents
(intuitively understood as ‘inferences’) we derive more sequents (i.e.,
more ‘inferences’). Which is to say, the action takes place at the level of
metainferences. [11, p. 8, our emphasis]
The result of the previous dialectic is, then, that some say that ST is not
paraconsistent, but is classical, because the only thing that matters is inferential
validity and at that level ST coincides with CL, whereas some others say that
ST is paraconsistent, but is not classical, because the only thing that matters is
meta-inferential validity and at that level ST coincides with LP.
We stand in the middle: we take that both inferential and meta-inferential va-
lidity matter. Since both matter, then particularly meta-inferential validity matters
and thus we think that ST deserves to be taken as a genuine paraconsistent logic.
But do we draw a symmetric conclusion and claim that ST is classical? No. This
might bother some objectors, and to the consideration of their potential objection
we now turn.
Thus, the third objection concerns the extent to which our proposed criterion of
paraconsistency is reasonable, and would run roughly as follows. It is unreasonable
to say that a logic is paraconsistent if either its inferential or its meta-inferential
consequence is, because this is an instance of a more general criterion that we would
not accept, for it has instances that we would reject. Namely, the general criterion
that
A logic is X if either its inferential or its meta-inferential consequence is X
Now, the objection may continue, if X is ‘classical’, then we have just said that
it would not be reasonable to accept that a logic is classical if e.g. its inferential
consequence is not classical, but its meta-inferential consequence is classical.
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To this we reply as follows. First of all, by claiming that a logic is paraconsistent
if either its inferential or its meta-inferential consequence is we are not necessarily
committed to accept the general criterion that a logic is X if either its inferential or
its meta-inferential consequence is X. This is so, just like accepting an instance of
the Law of Excluded Middle (e.g. ‘Either Goldbach’s Conjecture is true, or Gold-
bach’s Conjecture is false’) does not necessarily commit oneself to the unrestricted
acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, for one may think that there are cases
in which it may fail to hold (e.g. future contingents, etc.).
Finally, we do in fact think that there is a reason to refrain from adopting the
general criterion, i.e. that some of its instances are wrong, in particular, the instance
where X is ‘classical’. We are of the opinion that a logic being classical at some
inferential level does not propagate to a qualification of the entire logic, whereas a
logic being non-classical—and, in particular, paraconsistent—does propagate to a
qualification of the entire logic. The asymmetry resides, mainly, in the fact that
being classical is a characteristic that requires the fulfillment of certain inferential
features, while being non-classical and in particular paraconsistent is a characteristic
that requires the non-fulfillment of certain inferential features. As is stressed by
Ripley—in the quote of his that we mentioned in Section 1—paraconsistency is a
nonentailment claim, whereas it appears that classicality is an entailment claim.
For this reason, it is reasonable for us to say that there is a difference in being
paraconsistent, which requires that at least at some level (either the inferential
or the meta-inferential) this nonentailment claim holds, and being classical, which
seems to require that at all levels the entailment claim holds.
5 Conclusion
In the present paper we presented a new criterion for a logic to be paraconsistent :
if either the inferential or the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion is invalid
in L, then it is paraconsistent. Interestingly, we showed that a logic may invalidate
one but validate the other, contrary to what happens in logics that have a uniform
policy towards these matters, such as classical logic and LP which, respectively,
validate both and validate neither of the formulations. The study cases that we
focused on were two substructural logics, TS and ST; the former invalidates the
inferential, but invalidates the meta-inferential formulation of Explosion, and the
latter validates the inferential, but invalidates the meta-inferential version of Ex-
plosion. This strongly suggests that the proposed criterion is non-trivial and that
there are interesting cases of logics which deserve to be called paraconsistent and
that have not been regarded as such by the received view about paraconsistency,
which focused exclusively on the inferential formulation(s) of Explosion. By fo-
cusing on versions of Explosion which are not inferential, but meta-inferential, we
argued that Explosion comes in very different flavors and that it should be explored
with greater generality that it has been, until now.
Let us close these conclusions with one final comment. In this paper we dealt
with logical consequence between formulae and between sequents, thereby consid-
ering and evaluating inferential and meta-inferential versions of Explosion. But
nothing prevents us from taking the investigation one step further and considering
consequence relations between e.g. meta-sequents. Yet, again, if this is plausible,
why stop there? We can definitely consider consequence relations between meta-
meta-sequents, and so on and so forth. It can be easily seen how this procedure can
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be further reproduced, giving us a whole hierarchy of inferences concerned with the
logical relations between objects of the lower level(s). In doing so it is interesting
to, thus, look at inferences as having, or being of, some level represented by some
ordinal number. Common inferences relating formulae are, therefore, of level 0,
whereas meta-inferences are of level 1, meta-meta-inferences are of level 2, and so
on and so forth. In this vein, Explosion might be regarded as a meta-schematic
inference A,¬A ⇒α B, for α an ordinal. In other words, as a meta-scheme or
scheme of schemes, i.e. a scheme that gives, for each ordinal, a schematic inference,
namely the formulation of Explosion for that inferential level.
These surely are interesting directions to explore. A full exposition of them
will require defining how big the hierarchy is and if it has a fixed point or not,
how inferences at some peculiar levels (e.g. at limit ordinals) look, how do the
formulations of Explosion beyond the meta-inferential level look, and many other
technical and conceptual matters. Settling this issues is no doubt an interesting
task, but one which demands an amount of space beyond the one available for this
paper. We hope to investigate them in further research.
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